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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been a shift in payout policy over the last 15 years with firms opting to conduct stock 
repurchases over paying dividends. As repurchases have grown so has the corresponding 
research. Of particular note are findings that identify factors contributing to a firm’s buyback 
decision and as well as those that support the existence of long-run return anomalies. While 
several notable researchers have reported the prevalence and persistence of stock repurchase 
anomalies, this paper examines the history of repurchase theory and presents a theoretical 
repurchase prediction model. Using variables shown in the literature to have influence on the 
decision to repurchase stock, a probit estimation model is developed as a means to identify firms 
likely to conduct repurchase programs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n the traditional sense, modern finance has focused on the theory of dividend policy as a method of 
delivering value to stockholders. So much so, that every textbook in finance includes a chapter or two on 
the subject. However, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2004) indicate that the number of firms that 
pay dividends has fallen, while both Fama and French (2001) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that the 
number of stock repurchases has increased. This shift in payout policy has been significant and sustaining. Grullon 
and Ikenberry (2000) reported that between the five year period from 1995 to 1999, companies in the U.S. 
announced the repurchase of close to $750 billion worth of stock. During the same time frame, they also found, for 
the first time in history, more cash flows were distributed to investors by repurchases than by dividends.  
 
 As stock repurchases have grown in the U.S. so has the corresponding research. Of particular note is the 
finding that long-run return anomalies appear to exist. Early research by Loomis (1985) and Davidson and Garrison 
(1989) have shown the average returns of firms conducting repurchases to be as much as 8% above the average 
return on the overall market. More recently, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) found that during the 
1980’s the annual abnormal return for repurchase firms was 6.4% over a four year period. 
  
 Over the years there have been numerous theories as to why these firms have experienced long term return 
anomalies. Dittmar (2000), Maxwell and Stephens (2003) and Gelb (2000) provide evidence of a signaling theory. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000), D’Mello and Shroff (2000) and Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004), 
support the undervaluation theory.  The free-cash theory is supported by research performed by Guay and Harford 
(2000) and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2004).  
 
 This paper presents a theoretical prediction model of repurchase factors. A test to confirm the presence of 
abnormal returns associated with U.S. stock repurchases using the Fama-French 3-factor model will be discussed 
and a prediction model of repurchase factors will be presented.  Since the prediction model will be constructed of 
several variables from differing repurchase theories, a review of the various repurchase literature is conducted.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Many of the recent papers are concerned with the signaling theory of repurchases. Isagawa (2000) gave an 
I 
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explanation of open market stock repurchases and stock price behavior. He found that there is asymmetry of 
information with the private benefits managers can attain. His model showed that the repurchase announcements 
reveal information regarding these benefits. This differed from prior research, in that Isagawa (2000) showed that 
the announcements of open market repurchase programs can be believable without the restriction that the 
announcements are actually commitments. The model predicted that the price of a stock will fall before an open 
market announcement and subsequently rises once the announcement is made. In Isagawa (2002), a signaling 
equilibrium that does not assume that the repurchase announcement represents a commitment is established. This 
model assumed that repurchases are superior to dividends and that pessimistic noise exists when the interim cash 
flow is uncertain. However, it forecasted positive long-run stock returns and positive post open market 
announcement effects. 
 
 Maxwell and Stephens (2003) analyzed abnormal stock, bond and firm returns associated with repurchase 
announcements. Using a large sample of firms which held publicly traded debt and conducted a repurchase between 
1980 and 1990, the authors found during the announcement period stocks had abnormally positive returns; bonds 
had negative returns and there were positive returns to the firm. The standard event study methodology was used. 
Also found was an insignificant correlation between stock and bond returns. The authors contend that in view of the 
positive returns to the firm, the data does not support the wealth transfer theory. The sample was then segmented 
into positive and negative signal firms. For firms with a positive signal, statistically significant positive stock and 
bond abnormal returns were found. There was also negative correlation between bond values and changes in stock. 
The negative signal firms had statistically significant positive stock and negative bond abnormal returns, along with 
negative correlation between changes in stock and bond values. However, one drawback to their method is that the 
mean adjusted model used does not correct for changes in credit spreads. On the whole, Maxwell and Stephens 
(2003) showed that the gain to stockholders around open market repurchase announcements was a combination of 
the signaling and the wealth transfer theories. The degree to which theory is more prevalent was found to depend on 
the signal.  
 
 Taking an accounting approach to signaling, Gelb (2000) used stock repurchases, dividends and accounting 
disclosures to explore the substitutability among these signals. Evidence is presented that shows, for some firms, 
dividends and stock repurchases may be less costly than accounting disclosures and that firms operating in industries 
with low barriers to entry are more prone to transmitting favorable news through dividends or repurchases as 
opposed to using accounting disclosures. It seemed that these firms were trying to rely on repurchases to convey 
good news to investors without releasing the details of the information. Using a survey of financial executives on 
payout policies, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2004) also contend that dividends and repurchases are 
substitutes. 
 
 Just as popular in today’s research as the signaling theory, is the undervaluation approach. This is expected 
as it is truly a sub-sector of the signaling approach. Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004) used cross sectional differences 
in short and long run returns of firms conducting repurchases to investigate three key economic motives for 
repurchases; undervaluation, free cash flow, and altering leverage. The data set used consisted of over 5,000 U.S. 
firms that announced a repurchase between 1980 and 1996. It was found that the short-horizon reaction to 
repurchase announcements showed only minimal support for the mispricing theory and no evidence of the free cash 
flow hypothesis was identified. The long run horizon, however, showed the post repurchase drift exhibited some 
consistency with mispricing and to a lesser degree free cash flow.    
 
 In line with the findings of Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004), D’Mello and Shroff (2000) looked at equity 
undervaluation and decisions related to repurchase offers. Using an earning based residual income valuation model 
with the assumption that managers had perfect foresight, a direct test of whether firms that repurchase shares are 
undervalued compared to their economic value was conducted. Three relevant findings were revealed. First, 74 
percent of the repurchasing firms are undervalued prior to tender compared to 51 percent of the control sample of 
non-repurchasing firms. The authors also found that the tender premium is highly correlated with the magnitude of 
undervaluation. Lastly, the decision to satisfy oversubscription demand is significantly influenced by the magnitude 
of undervaluation. The results were consistent even when the perfect foresight assumption is dropped. This suggests 
that decisions to repurchase are in line with managers possessing superior information regarding their firm’s true 
economic value and thus, support the undervaluation theory.  
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 Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) studied 737 privately negotiated (greenmail) stock repurchases between the 
years 1984 and 2001. They found, contrary to previous research, positive announcement returns and premiums that 
are not significantly different from zero. Three conclusions are evident from this analysis. First, similar to other 
recent findings, a firm will repurchase shares from investors only when the stock is undervalued. Second, the market 
does not seem to recognize the undervaluation. The last finding is that target repurchase premiums are mainly 
determined by the bargaining power of the seller and the firm. Comparable findings on the issue of greenmail 
repurchases were also found by Chang and Hertzel (2004).  
 
 Differing from the results of other repurchase theories, Grullon and Michaely (2004) found that 
announcement of repurchase programs were not followed by an increase in performance. Still, there was a decrease 
in systematic risk and cost of capital in repurchasing firms as compared to non-repurchasing firms. This is consistent 
with the theory of free cash flow. As is the finding that in firms more likely to over-invest, the market reaction to 
repurchase announcements is more positive. Investors, on the other hand, were found to underestimate the cost of 
capital and thus, under-react to the firms’ announcement.  
 
 Additional evidence of the free cash flow theory came from Guay and Harford (2000). They found that 
firms tend to issue repurchases from cash streams that were not of regular occurrence while dividends were 
distributed from cash flows that were considered permanent. As mentioned earlier, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely (2004) contend that dividends and repurchases are substitutes. However these findings also support the 
Guay and Hartford (2000) findings of residual/permanent cash-flow disbursements.  
 
 Grinstein and Michaely (2005) examined the relationship between institutional holdings and payout policy 
in U.S. public firms. To test their hypothesis, the authors used a large data set of corporate payouts and institutional 
holdings between 1980 and 1996. It was discovered that institutions are not generally attracted to firms that pay out 
more. But, of the firms that do pay out, institutions seem to prefer those that conduct repurchases on a regular basis 
to those that pay dividends or only repurchase sporadically. No evidence was found that firms signaled their true 
value by increasing dividends as a means to attract institutions. Quite conversely, as a group, it appeared that 
institutions reduce their holdings in firms that do increase their dividend payout while boosting the holdings in firms 
tending to pursue repurchases.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Fama French Time Series Test of Abnormal Returns 
 
 The methodology to be used in this model would stem largely from the model proposed by Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000). First, in order to test for long-term abnormal returns, the Fama-French 3-factor 
model would be employed to calculate monthly returns in calendar time for a portfolio of firms that conducted a 
repurchase. Firms would be added to the portfolio and held for the following three years. As months pass, new firms 
are added and firms that have reached the 3 year mark are withdrawn from the portfolio. The firms would be 
weighted equally and the returns calculated for year 1, year 2 and year 3.  
 
 Using a time series regression on the repurchase portfolio the model would be: 
 
Rpt – Rrf = α + βpm(Rmt – Rft) + βps(SMBt) + βph(HMLt) +εt 
 
where α is a measure for the abnormal return. SMB is defined as the difference between the returns on diversified 
portfolios of small and large cap stocks and HML is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of 
high and low book-to-market stocks. The term Rmt – Rft reflects the market risk premium for time period t.  
 
 
 After the regression is run, the following hypothesis would be tested for statistical and economic 
significance via t-test: 
 
Ho:  α = 0 (the abnormal returns of the portfolio are equal to zero). 
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Ha:  α ≠ 0 (Abnormal returns are present in the sample). 
 
This would be conducted to first identify positive abnormal returns. Once done, the prediction model can 
be constructed. 
 
Repurchase Prediction Model  
 
 To begin the model, the sample of firms that conducted a repurchase would be used in conjunction with a 
sample of non-repurchasing firms. Due to the selection process of the repurchased firms, when combined, the 
samples are not purely random. To account for this Waldman (2000) recommends that the observations be weighted 
in the log-likelihood function. In this case, for those that repurchased, the weight would be the fraction in the 
population who chose to repurchase divided by the fraction in the sample that chose to repurchase. 
 
 Using variables which have been shown to have influence in a firm’s decision to repurchase its stock, the 
theoretical probit estimation model would be: 
 
RP = β0 + β1(Rm – Rf) + β2SMB +β3HML + β4ΔCF + β5TOSO + β6IND + β7ΔAE + β8GDPGR +β9$MRP + β10PRP 
+ ε  
 
 The first three variables are proxies for market conditions, size and under/over-valuation. These Fama 
French factors have received notable attention in the academic literature, most notably by Fama-French (1996), 
Dittmar (2000), and in Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995, 2000).  
 
 Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) and Dejong, Van Dijk, and Veld (2003) found support of the 
free cash flow theory. They found that firms with excess cash are likely to payout more through repurchases to 
reduce agency costs. The variable ΔCF is defined as the percent change in total cash flows from the two most 
recently completed quarters as a proxy for free cash flows. 
 
 TOSO is a proxy for total outstanding stock options. It has been found by Kahle(2002) and Dejong, Van 
Dijk, and Veld (2003) that the presence of stock options create an incentive for firms to repurchase.  
 
 In a recent study of stock repurchases and industry affiliation, Liano, Huang and Manakyan (2003) identify 
significant differences in the returns across industry groups. As such, IND is a dummy variable to account for 
industry affiliation.  
 
 In addition to their previous findings, Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) site earnings as an important factor 
in a firm’s decision to conduct a repurchase. ΔAE represented by the percent change in annual earnings is a proxy to 
capture this. 
 
 The variables MRP and PRP are the dollar value of repurchases in the market for the previous quarter and a 
dummy variable for previous repurchases with 3 years. GDPGR is the growth rate of GDP and is included to 
consider overall economic conditions.  
 
 For convenience, the above model will be presented in the matrix format written as: RPi = Xβ, where RPi is 
a qualitative dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm conducts a repurchase and a zero if not. β is a vector of 
the coefficients to be estimated and X is the matrix of the independent variables. The error term is not present in the 
model, however, appears in an unobserved repurchase index of the explanatory variables, expressed as (Xβ + ε).  In 
this case, a firm is viewed as having a level of utility associated with choosing a repurchase (RP=1). If this utility 
exceeds a threshold (usually normalized to zero) then the firm will repurchase. This can be seen as:  
 
Pr(RPi=1) = Pr(Xβ +ε > 0) = Pr (ε > -Xβ) 
 
 This is a cumulative normal distribution function from which we can compute the probability of a firm to 
conduct a repurchase. Estimation would be undertaken by employing maximum likelihood using the weighted log 
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likelihood function discussed above. A likelihood ratio test would be performed to test: 
 
Ho:  All β = 0 (The independent variables have no significant effect on the probability that a firm will conduct a 
repurchase) 
 
Ha:  All β ≠ 0 (The independent variables have an effect on the probability of repurchase)  
 
 The estimation results of the probit equation and the LR test would be presented along with a prediction 
success table. It is important to note that since a probit model was estimated differences in the output data will be 
seen. For instance, probit models will generally return very low R2. There is no universally accepted goodness of fit 
measure, however, a paper by Veall and Zimmerman (1996) provides several alternative measures. Also, when 
looking at the variables, the marginal effect of the independent variable on the repurchase decision (1/0) is not given 
by the variables coefficient. In this case, the marginal effect would vary with each observation. A common practice 
to report the marginal effects is to report the mean values of the independent variables as a basis for inferring 
changes in probability. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 There has been a shift in payout policy over the last 15 years with firms opting to conduct stock 
repurchases over paying dividends. The literature has yielded numerous theories and findings. Of particular note are 
findings that identify factors contributing to a firm’s buyback decision and as well as those that support the existence 
of long-run return anomalies. While several notable researchers have reported the prevalence and persistence of 
stock repurchase anomalies, this paper examined the history of repurchase theory and presented a theoretical 
repurchase prediction model. Using variables shown in the literature to have influence on the decision to repurchase 
stock, a probit estimation model was developed as a means to identify firms likely to conduct repurchase programs. 
The results of the model, if constructed with data, would provide support for or evidence against the individual 
repurchase theories.    
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